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Background. Causes produce effects via underlying mechanisms that must be inferred
from observable and unobservable structures. Preschoolers show sensitivity to
mechanisms in machine-like systems with perceptually distinct causes and effects, but
little is known about how children extend causal reasoning to the natural continuous
processes studied in elementary school science, or how other abilities impact on this.
Aims. We investigated the development of children’s ability to predict, observe, and
explain three causal processes, relevant to physics, biology, and chemistry, taking into
account their verbal and non-verbal ability.
Sample. Children aged 5–11 years (N = 107) from London and Oxford, with wide
ethnic/linguistic variation, drawn from the middle/upper socioeconomic status (SES)
range.
Methods. Children were tested individually on causal tasks focused on sinking,
absorption, and dissolving, using a novel approach in which they observed contrasting
instances of each, to promote attention to mechanism. Further tasks assessed verbal
(expressive vocabulary) and non-verbal (block design) ability.
Results. Reports improvedwith age, thoughwith differences between tasks. Even young
participants gave good descriptions of what they observed. Causal explanations were
more strongly related to observation than to prediction from prior knowledge, but
developedmore slowly. Non-verbal but not generic verbal ability predicted performance.
Conclusions. Reasoning about continuous processes is within the capacity of children
from school entry, even using verbal reports, though they find it easier to address more
rapid processes. Mechanism inference is uncommon, with non-verbal ability an important
influence on progress. Our research is the first to highlight this key factor in children’s
progress towards thinking about scientific phenomena.
Causal cognition – the ability to perceive and infer cause–effect relations – lies at the core
of scientific investigation and is equally crucial in everyday thinking. It revolves around the
notion that causes produce effects by means of an underlying mechanism. While some
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aspects of a phenomenon are observable, causal cognition goes beyond immediate
observation and requires inference from observables to invisible factors.
Although humans employ a variety of sources, such as statistical relations, prior
knowledge or temporal information, cuing them to access causal mechanism, twomodes
of human inference have typically been seen as connecting these observable and
unobservable determinants: observation of regularities, and intervention (Danks, 2005;
Lagnado& Sloman, 2004; Lagnado,Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007; Gopnik et al.,
2004; Steyvers, Tenenbaum,Wagenmakers, &Blum, 2003;Waldmann&Hagmayer, 2005;
see also Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Sloman, 1996, for
associative accounts; and e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004, on probabilistic inference; Sloman &
Lagnado, 2005 on how counterfactual reasoning is seen as a type of imagined
intervention). The question here is whether children can conceive causal mechanisms
from observation.
Preschoolers engage in inferences about mechanism in clearly structured causal
systems, typically simplemachines, provided they have prior knowledge or experience of
these (Buchanan & Sobel, 2011; Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Schlottmann,
1999; Shultz, 1982). Buchanan and Sobel (2011) showed children that pressing one of two
buttons made a light go on; the causal button had a sticker andwas connected to the light
by awire or had abattery inside. Four-year-olds predicted that if thewirewas switched, the
other button would make the light come on; even 3-year-olds predicted this if the battery
was switched. Neither age thought switching stickers would affect the outcome,
indicating prior knowledge of what was relevant to the mechanism, and concern with
how this led from cause to effect beyond what was observed.
However, although such demonstrations show preschool children are able to engage
in forms of mechanism-based reasoning, the tasks typically consider the effects of
mechanism-related variables on outcome. Children were not asked about, nor under-
stood, presumably, the processes by which these variables exerted their effects, for
instance, the operation of electrical circuits or chemical reactions inside the battery. Little
is known about how this level of understanding develops, or how children go on to reason
causally about less clearly structured or never fully observed processes in the natural
world, although they encounter these in much elementary school science. There are
related literatures, such as work on children’s intuitions regarding physical phenomena
(see Wilkening & Cacchione, 2011), but the tasks used in this are designed to elicit pre-
existing and implicit knowledge of causal connections, not explicit reasoning about
processes to further such knowledge.
This study aims to provide the first systematic investigation of such thinking, and
whether children can acquire causal knowledge from observation of natural phenomena
relying on continuous processes without intervention. We examined the developmental
trajectory of 5- to 11-year-olds’ predictive, observational, and explanatory competences
with regard to reports of three phenomena, relevant to physics, biology, and chemistry
(sinking, absorption, and solution), chosen to encompass a manageable range of familiar
everyday phenomena. Using a new paradigm, children were asked to consider directly
contrasting instances of each phenomenon, to draw their attention to the mechanisms
involved (See D€undar-Coecke & Tolmie, 2019a, in press) on the benefit of contrasting
instances in revealing causal relationships). Our objective was to determine the extent to
which they were able to engage with thinking about causal mechanisms, and how far this
related to their prior knowledge and current observation of the phenomena, and to their
verbal and non-verbal ability.
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From causal events to causal processes
Causal reasoning tasks in both the developmental and adult literature typically involve
simplemachines, that is physical (or virtual) apparatuswith distinct components yielding a
well-defined, segmented sequence of events. Such structure helps operationalizewhatmay
be the cause, mediating mechanism and effect, allowing experimental manipulation of
what can be observed and has to be inferred. Other adult studies involve descriptions of
causal sequences (Buchsbaum, Griffiths, Plunkett, Gopnik, & Baldwin, 2015; Talmy, 1988;
White, 2014),which help structure events that in real lifemay bemore continuous and less
easy to segment. Some paradigms in the tradition of Michotte (1946/1963; Schlottmann,
Ray, Mitchell, & Demetriou, 2006) involve reasoning about brief events, mostly collisions,
which alsoprovide natural segmentation. This schemaof causality betweendistinct, clearly
segmented events is common to the vast majority of psychological studies.
However, some forms of causality seem excluded by this. In particular, natural systems
typically involve temporally more extended continuous processes, as when an object sinks,
dissolves, or absorbs water. Here, there are no distinct cause and effect events; a standard
causality-as-events approach would imply that the hand letting go of the stone is the event
that causes its sinking, but this is intuitively ‘not the right cause’ and would seem better
regarded as an enabling condition. Salmon (1984) distinguished causality in such continuous
processes fromcausal interactions, though thedistinction isnot absolute (Kitcher, 1989); for
example, sinking involves an interaction of a stone subject to gravity with water pushing
upwards. However, while processes can – and perhaps need to – be considered as chains of
interactions, no interaction is actually perceived – one sees the stone sink, but must think
about the role of thewater. Observers therefore do not see the sinking as either caused by a
distinct event via amediatingmechanism, or as an interaction between stone andwater; the
phenomenal experience presented by the causal sequence is of a uniform, unsegmented
processcausedbya continuouslyoperatingunderlyingmechanism– the stone sinksbecause
the buoyancy of the water holding it up is less than theweight of the object pulling it down.
Reasoning about causality-as-events, interactions and causality-as-processes all aim to
distinguish true from spurious or pseudo-causality by appeal to an underlyingmechanism.
In each case, children must reason beyond what may be observed at the perceptual
surface. However, the distinct components of machines typically reveal the operation of
the underlyingmechanismmore clearly, while itmay requiremore effort to go beyond the
perceptual surface of continuous processes. We argue therefore that reasoning about
causal mechanisms underlying the simple physical processes encountered in elementary
science is a step up from causal reasoning about the toy-machine systems previously
studied, and investigate here children’s ability to extend their causal thinking to these.
In doing so, we focus on children’s capacity to address variation in a single feature of
each process, its speed. We focus on this because speed is a characteristic feature of
continuous processes. Processes differ in the speed with which they unfold – sinking is
generally faster than absorption, which in turn is faster than solution – and this may affect
children’s ability to observe and infer from observation. More importantly, though, there
are differences in speedwithin each process, depending on the objects involved – a stone
sinks faster than a berry, for instance. The cause of this difference relates to the underlying
mechanism; for example, the stone sinks faster because the imbalance between liquid and
object density is greater. Witnessing this variation in speed alters the experience from a
simple instance of a class of phenomena to one of related but quantitatively contrasting
instances, leaving this difference to be explained. The use of minimally contrasting cases
to highlight a problem dimension derives from perceptual psychology (Gibson &Gibson,
1955) and is frequent in science education (Schwartz, Chase, Oppezzo, & Chin, 2011).
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Here, these contrasts should help children structure their observations, orienting them
towards the target mechanism in an otherwise uniform process.
Causal reasoning with words
We focus here on how children reason about observed causal processes in their verbal
reports. Looking at their causal reasoning in this way is novel, as we moved from the
largely non-verbal responses used in preschool causal studies to explanations, to provide
insight into how causal reasoning develops towards more demanding forms.
Asking children for explanations about causal phenomena through direct questions has
been common since Piaget (1929; see his open-ended questions about natural phenomena,
e.g., where the sun came from; and similarly Gelman & Kremer, 1991, tasks combining
‘what’ and ‘why’ questions distinguishingnatural phenomena fromhuman-made artefacts).
This work documents that children can give reasonable explanations of simple events from
the preschool age (e.g., why leaves turn brown), and that explanations increasewith age in
sophistication and accuracy (Vosniadou, 2014; Zaitchik, Solomon, Tardiff, & Bascandziev,
2016). Other studies show that children are active causal explanation-seekers (Carey, 1985;
Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Legare, 2014; Legare & Lombrozo, 2014; Walker, Lombrozo,
Williams, Rafferty, & Gopnik, 2017; Wellman & Gelman, 1998).
The difference between previously employedmethods and those used here is that real
phenomena were demonstrated live using direct comparison, allowing children to
observe the causal processes. Their explanations did not rely purely on prior knowledge;
therefore, the aim was to ask them to make inferences from their observations, following
the approach generally adopted in causal reasoning research.We elicited verbal reports of
these demonstrations in structured fashion, separating explanation, as ameasure of ability
to reason beyond what was observed, from prediction based on prior knowledge and
description of current observation. We also followed up their initial answers, to minimize
verbal demands and response ambiguities by posing further structured questions and by
supporting children’s expression of knowledge through careful probing.
The measure of explanation was designed to distinguish between children who could
only identify simple factors at work in the observed phenomena (e.g., weight), thosewho
recognized that variation in these factors is associatedwith differences in speed of process
(i.e., who treat them as variables), and those whowere able to move beyond variables per
se, to think about the underlying mechanisms connecting variables to outcomes. The
measures of prior knowledge and description made it possible to assess how far level of
explanation was a function of existing knowledge versus current observation.
Nevertheless, we were aware that apparent quality of explanation might reflect limited
language not limited reasoning: although children’s understanding of natural causal events is
often sophisticated, theymayperformpoorly compared to adults at expressing and assessing
their own causal knowledge (Legare & Clegg, 2014). It is for this reason that developmental
psychologists in recentyearshave attempted to capture their understandingusingnon-verbal
tasks. To address this, measures of language and non-verbal ability were included, as a direct
test of how far children’s explanations are specifically a function of verbal ability.
Method
Participants
We recruited 120 children, with parental consent, from three primary schools in London
and Oxford. We subsequently excluded 13 participants for low attention span or
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unwillingness to continue; one child was excluded following parental request, leaving
107 individuals for analysis (35 from Year 1 [Y1], mean age = 6 years, 1 month,
SD = 4.4 months; 33 fromYear 3 [Y3],mean age = 8 years, 4 months, SD = 5.9 months;
39 from Year 5 [Y5], mean age = 10 years, 3 months, SD = 5.9 months).
Of 103 participants whose parents responded, 59 (55.1%) were from monolingual
(English) environments, and 44 (41.1%) from bilingual/trilingual homes, confirming the
sample encompassed wide ethnic/linguistic variation. The sample was skewed towards
the upper ranges of socioeconomic status (SES), with 8 (7.5%) parents being manual
workers, 17 (15.9%) self-employed/non-manual workers, and 78 (72.9%) professionals.
One parent (0.9%) had only GCSE (basic secondary school) qualifications; 6 (5.6%) had A
levels (higher secondary); 39 (36.4%) had undergraduate degrees; 33 (30.8%) had
postgraduate degrees or professional qualifications; and 24 (23.3%) had doctoral degrees.
Materials and procedure
Taskswere given to children in fixedorder, as below,within a single one-to-one session, in
a quiet location within school. Sessions lasted on average 37 min (min = 18, max = 45).
Responses were recorded manually on score sheets, but children’s replies during the
causal reasoning tasks were also audio-recorded for later checking.
The expressive vocabulary and block design subtests from theWechsler Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence (WASI) (Wechsler, 2011) were used to provide measures of verbal
and non-verbal ability. Administration and scoring followed standard procedures.
The three causal tasks each highlighted a direct contrast between two instances of the
target phenomenon, presented simultaneously. For sinking, children saw a stone and a
blueberry of similar size but different densities,which sank at different rates in a large jar of
water. For absorption, they sawwater rising from a Petri dish through strips of tissue and
blotting paper of the same length/width, the water rising faster through the more open
structure of the tissue. For solution, children saw the same small quantities of table and
rock salt dissolve inwarmwater, the greater surface area to volumeof the table salt leading
to more rapid solution (see Figure 1).
Each task had the same three-stage structure, in which children: (1) inspected the
contrastingmaterials andwere askedwhat they thoughtwouldhappenwhen theywere put
into the water (prediction from prior knowledge); (2) watched the focal events and were
asked to describewhat they had noticed; and (3) were asked to explainwhy they thought
things had happened in the way that they had seen. At each stage, they were encouraged to
give as full an answer as they could (e.g., ‘do you think the same thingwill happen to both?’;
‘did you notice anything else?’; ‘do you think there might be another reason?’).
Responseswere given initial scores for prior knowledge, description, and explanation as
children answered (see Table 1 for scoring system). Prior knowledge and description were
scored for accuracy of anticipating/reporting differences in sinking/absorption/solution
rate. Explanation scoringbegan at theminimal level of theobserved factor(s) (score of 1); via
making explicit that these are variables linked to the observed differences in speed of the
contrasting examples (score of 2); to a statement about the underlying mechanism which
produced the effect (score of 3) (Example responses are shown in Appendix).
To confirm reliability, two researchers subsequently scored all responses indepen-
dently from the audio-recordings. Agreement was 93%, and final scores were assigned
following discussion and checking the audios in the small number of instances where
there was a difference.
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Composite scores were computed for each task (0–7), for each response component
(0–6 for prior knowledge and description; 0–9 for explanation), and for number of
mechanism-level responses across tasks (0–3).
Results
Analyses utilized data from the 107 participants who completed testing appropriately,
except where noted. All tests were two-sided where relevant with p < .05. Observed
power for regression analyses was .95.
Causal task performance
Tasks
Figure 2 shows the response profiles for each age group on the sinking, absorption, and
solution tasks, based on composite scores across prior knowledge, description, and
explanation. Performancewas best on sinking, followed by absorption,with solution some
Tasks Materials
Sinking
(stone, blueberry)
Absorption
(blotting paper, 
tissue paper)
Solution
(table salt,
rock salt)
Figure 1. Materials used in the causal tasks.
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waybehind. A two-waymixedANOVA (taskwithin-subjects, age between-subjects) found a
significant main effect of task, F(2, 208) = 47.202, p < .001, partial eta-squared = .312,
with no significant difference between scores on sinking and absorption using a Bonferroni
comparison, but with both significantly higher than scores for solution. There was also a
main effect of age group, F(2, 104) = 24.250, p < .001, partial eta-squared = .318, with
scores for Y1 significantly lower than Y3, but no difference between Y3 and Y5; and a
modest task 9 age interaction, F(4, 208) = 5.056, p = .001, partial eta-squared = .089,
reflecting greater growth on solution between Y1 and Y3 than for sinking and absorption.
Causal components
The profiles of each age group for prior knowledge, description, and causal explanation
across the three causal tasks are shown in Figure 3. Children performed at a high level on
description, slightly less well on prior knowledge, and at a notably lower level on causal
explanation. For description, 91.6% of children obtained themaximum score in the sinking
task, 85% in absorption, and 57.9% in solution. For prior knowledge, the corresponding
values were 72.9% for sinking, 62.6% for absorption, and 37.4% for solution.
In contrast, for explanation, only 9.3% got the highest score in sinking, 14% for
absorption, and 4.7% for solution. Themajority of explanation responses on all three tasks
focused solely on identification of causal factors or variables (scores of 1 or 2). Although
mechanism responses became more common in the two older groups (for sinking, there
were 0 in Y1, 4 in Y3, and 5 in Y5; for absorption, 1, 6, and 8 respectively, and for solution,
0, 0, and 5), children apparently found it difficult tomake the shift to this level of thinking.
Table 1. Scoring system for causal tasks
Component Sinking Absorption Solution
Prediction from
prior knowledge (0–2)
Correct prediction for
stone (i.e., sinks) = 1
Correct prediction for
difference between
stone and berry (i.e.,
sink at different
speeds) = 1
Correct prediction for
tissue paper = 1
Correct prediction for
difference between
tissue and blotting
paper = 1
Correct prediction for
table salt = 1
Correct prediction for
difference between
table and rock salt = 1
Description of
observation (0–2)
Correct description for
stone = 1
Correct description for
berry = 1
Correct description for
tissue paper = 1
Correct description for
blotting paper = 1
Correct description for
table salt = 1
Correct description for
rock salt = 1
Explanation/inference
(0–3)
No/irrelevant
explanation = 0
Weight/size without
difference between
objects = 1
Weight/size with
difference = 2
Density and
mechanism = 3
No/irrelevant
explanation = 0
Thickness/softness/
texture etc. without
difference between
types of paper = 1
Thickness/softness/
texture etc. with
difference = 2
Nature of papers/holes
and mechanism = 3
No/irrelevant
explanation = 0
Grain/size etc. without
difference between
types of salt = 1
Grain/size etc. with
difference = 2
Grain/size etc. with
surface area and
mechanism = 3
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2. Profile of scores on (a) sinking; (b) absorption; and (c) solution (max = 7).
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3. Profile of scores on (a) prior knowledge (max = 6); (b) description (max = 6); and (c) causal
explanation (max = 9).
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However, if they made any reference to mechanism at all, they tended to do so on more
than one task, at over 2.5 times the chance rate, so the shift appeared to be domain-general
when it occurred.
Direct statistical comparisons between the components were not made, given
differences in the scales and dimensions measured. However, one-way ANOVAs showed
age-related progression on each: for prior knowledge, F(2, 104) = 12.376, p < .001, partial
eta-squared = .192; for description, F(2, 104) = 18.336, p < .001, partial eta-
squared = .261; and for explanation, F(2, 104) = 17.383, p < .001, partial eta-
squared = .251. For each component, there were significant differences between Y1 and
Y3,butnotbetweenY3andY5.Thecomponentswerepositively correlatedwitheachother,
controlling for age (for prior knowledge and description, r = .392; for prior knowledge and
explanation, r = .414; for description and explanation, r = .618, all p < .001).
Is children’s causal reasoning associated with verbal and non-verbal ability?
There was significant positive skew on block design, due to the oldest age group having a
longer tail. Vocabulary was normally distributed. One-way ANOVAs found significant
increases with age on both, however: for vocabulary, Welch robust statistic = 54.093
(df = 2, 67.790); for block design, 45.070 (2, 63.948), p < .001 for both, with significant
differences between all three age groups on both measures: for vocabulary,
Y1 mean = 22.89, SD = 5.290, Y3 mean = 30.76, SD = 5.863, Y5 mean = 35.62,
SD = 5.204; for block design, Y1 mean = 11.91, SD = 6.085, Y3 mean = 19.15,
SD = 9.517, Y5 mean = 34.19, SD = 13.250. Variance was not notably attenuated for
either measure: for vocabulary, overall mean = 29.95, SD = 7.586; for block design,
overall mean = 22.23, SD = 13.860.
Correlations between variables
Zero-order Pearson correlations showed the three causal components were positively
associated with both vocabulary and block design scores, which were themselves
positively correlated with each other (Table 2). The relationship of block design to the
causal measures was logarithmic, and log block design (the logarithmic transform) was
more strongly correlated with these than the untransformed score. When age in months
Table 2. Zero-order and partial correlations between causal reasoning, verbal, and non-verbal ability
(significant associations in bold)
Prior Description Explanation WASI vocab Block Block (log)
Prior 1 .518*** .531*** .466*** .473*** .555***
Description .392*** 1 .703*** .439*** .391*** .476***
Explanation .414*** .618*** 1 .467*** .441*** .516***
WASI vocabulary .265** .150 .224* 1 .677*** .679***
Block design .286** .104 .195* .416*** 1 .923***
Block design
(logarithmic)
.408*** .241* .315*** .431*** .867*** 1
Notes. Zero-order correlations above diagonal, N = 107; partial correlations below diagonal, N = 106
due to missing date of birth data for one participant.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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was controlled for, log block design showed a stronger correlation with the components
than vocabulary, which was uncorrelated with description responses. Parental occupa-
tion and education correlated with each other, r = .609, but otherwise only with non-
verbal ability, .261, p = .008 and .382, p < .001, respectively, and are not considered
further.
Hierarchical regression models
Hierarchical regressions examined the unique variance accounted for by verbal and non-
verbal ability, given the association between them. Taking causal component scores and
number of mechanism responses as the dependents, age in months was entered in the
first, WASI vocabulary in the second, and log block design at the third stage, to assess
whether their effects were distinct from each other.
This analysis produced significant models and final adjusted R-square in all four
analyses (Table 3). Vocabulary was a significant predictor at the second stage for prior
knowledge and explanation, but not for description, confirming the partial correlation; or
for mechanism responses. The inclusion of log block design consistently led to both age
and vocabulary dropping out, leaving it the only predictor, with one exception –
description, where age remained significant.
Path analysis using amaximum likelihood approachwas employed to test the fit of the
regression model for mechanism responses, treating age as a background influence. The
model in which the influence of vocabulary was entirely mediated by log block design
(Figure 4) provided the best fit to the data, chi-square = 0.007, df = 1, p = .932. A further
mediation–moderation analysis confirmed these effects, showing that there was no
interaction between vocabulary and blocks (p > .05), and that there was full mediation:
Table 3. Hierarchical regression analysis with component causal scores and mechanism responses as
dependent variable (significant predictors in bold)
Model M1 M2 M3
Predictor b
Prior knowledge Age in months .424*** .197 .059
WASI vocabulary .330** .136
Block design (log) .425***
Adj R2 = .304; DR2 = .180*** for M1; .057** for M2; .087*** for M3
Description Age in months .502*** .379** .300*
WASI vocabulary .178 .067
Block design (log) .243*
Adj R2 = .277; DR2 = .252*** for M1; .017** for M2; .028* for M3
Explanation Age in months .472*** .285* .185
WASI vocabulary .272* .132
Block design (log) .307*
Adj R2 = .287; DR2 = .223*** for M1; .039* for M2; .045* for M3
Mechanism Age in months .284** .191 .088
WASI vocabulary .135 .010
Block design (log) .317*
Adj R2 = .114; DR2 = .081** for M1; .010 for M2; .048* for M3.
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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the direct effect of vocabulary was non-significant, b = .00, SE = .01, t = 0.24, p = .81
with a small unstandardized indirect effect b = .02, CI = 0.01–0.05, standardized
effect = .24, indicating the path model was robust.
Discussion
The development of causal reasoning about continuous processes
Differences between the three causal processes
Children’s reports improved with age for all three continuous processes. However, there
were task differences as well, with sinking easiest, and solution most difficult. Whether
dissolving is more difficult in general for children, or whether the task differences here
reflect issues with the specific examples of the processes chosen remains open.
We originally chose these three processes in part for their obvious contrast in relative
speed, on the view that faster processes,with lower demands on sustained attention,might
be easier for children, and the outcomes were consistent with this. It took 1–3 s for the
stone and berry to sink, 3–5 s for the water to rise through the tissue/blotting papers, but
60–120 s for the smaller and larger grains of salt to visibly begin to dissolve. However, there
are other possible accounts. Solution was also harder to see because of the smaller scale at
which it occurred; it involves a less accessible, sub-microscopicmechanism (Liu& Lesniak,
2006); and although children encounter many instances of dissolving in everyday life
(cocoa, sweets, soap), these may be less frequent than instances of sinking/absorption.
Associative learning accounts of causal induction from everyday experience would also
predict lower levels of learning for less temporally contingent events even if these were
encountered with equal frequency, since the contingency would be less evident.
Future research could directly test whether the speed of a process affects children’s
ability to track it during observation – consistent with Maurice-Naville and Montangero’s
(1992) reports of elementary school children’s difficulties grasping the effects of slowly
progressing forest disease – and whether longer timeframes demand more concentration
– consistent with Rieber’s (1991) finding that fourth graders only benefited from an
animated demonstration of Newton’s second law when this was presented in short
sequences.
Figure 4. Path model including standardized coefficients for the effects of age, vocabulary, and log block
design on mechanism responses (subsidiary relationships in grey).
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Differences between components of causal task responses
Results demonstrated a clear progressionwith age on all causal components. The different
components differed widely in difficulty, however, with description ahead of prior
knowledge, and explanation trailing far behind. Just under 80% of children across all ages
and tasksmade and reported completely accurate observations; even for themost difficult
dissolving process, 31% of the youngest children achieved the top score for description.
For prior knowledge, nearly 58% of children got the highest scores overall. The lack of
progress between Y3 and Y5 on these two components therefore seems largely
attributable to good levels of performance having already been achieved by 8-year-olds.
Since children did well on description, they plainly have the language for observation,
and if prediction lags behind, it seemsmore likely to be due to lack of knowledge than lack
of words.
Causal explanation scores trailed by longway, with only about 9% reaching top scores
across the three tasks and all age groups, and mechanism responses were comparatively
unusual – only a fifth of children, the majority in the oldest age group, identified any
underlying causalmechanism – although once that insightwas achieved, it appeared to be
quickly extended tomultiple processes. Children’s explanations were typically limited to
abstracting causal variables from the observed objects, and the youngest age group was
commonly unable even to explicitly relate causal factors to the observed speed
differences, that is to actually treat these as variables. Variable abstraction implies
increased selective attention to the perceptual input across observed instances of
processes, but identification of mechanisms to account for these variables imposes
substantially greater inferential demands. For causal explanation, therefore, the lack of
progress between Y3 and Y5 is attributable to children finding it difficult tomove on from
abstraction of variables to identification of mechanisms.
One can suggest that children’s mechanism responsesmight have been the product of
instruction rather inference. However, note that four points indicate this is on the whole
unlikely: (1) the relatively weak relationship of prior knowledge to explanation,
compared to that between description and explanation, suggests responses were
constructed largely from observation; (2) although they were infrequent, mechanism
responses were given by some younger participants, who would not yet have had more
technical instruction in concepts like density, porosity, and solubility; (3) conversely,
despite the fact that the topicswerewithin the curriculumcontent,mechanism responses
were only given by a minority of Y5 children, and there were clear differences between
sinking, absorption, and solution, again suggesting that observing the contrast phenom-
ena was more important – the difficulties in perceiving the solution events are a more
plausible source of these variations; and (4) provision of mechanism responses was
influenced by non-verbal ability, while effects of instruction seem more likely to be
mediated by verbal ability.
However, if observation was central to children’s performance, there is plainly a long
way from good descriptive ability to higher-level inferential responses. The striking lag in
the explanation component may be because explanation of mechanisms places higher
demands on children’s language. We know from the preschool studies involving distinct
causal systems that in principle children of this age have no limitation in thinking about
mechanism (Buchanan & Sobel, 2011; Bullock et al., 1982; Schlottmann, 1999; Shultz,
1982). Further investigation is therefore needed to establish how far prompting children
to give thorough explanations mitigated the verbal demands of our tasks. However, as we
discuss below, there is good reason to think that language skillsper sewerenot the issue. It
seems more likely that children find continuous processes hard to analyse at this level.
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Comparisonswith adults using our paradigmare needed, sincemechanism reportsmay be
sparse even among them; no research has examined this to date.
Do verbal and non-verbal ability predict children’s causal reasoning about continuous
processes?
Verbal ability, as indexed by vocabulary, did not predict performance on any of the three
causal components, ormechanism responses, arguably themost verbally demanding level
of inference. This might potentially reflect the broadly homogenous nature of the sample,
with relatively high socioeconomic background – except that vocabulary scores were
normally distributed, and there was no indication that variance in verbal ability was
limited enough to prevent it having predictive power.Wenote also that the verbal taskwe
usedwas generic, though,with a focus on everyday language.During testing,weobserved
that children who reported causal mechanisms tended to use more abstract/scientific
vocabulary. Such languagemay bemore specifically related to causal reasoning and could
therefore bemore discriminating. D€undar-Coecke & Tolmie, (2019b) present preliminary
data suggesting that the relationship is real, though no investigation has focused on this
previously, again, suggesting a gap in the literature.
Although it is not entirely clear whether grasp of causal processes is influenced by
verbal competence, on these data its impact appears to be limited. One possibility is that
non-verbal impressions from previously and currently observed phenomena are more
critical than explicit concepts, and that these impressions are combined and then
translated as far as possible into the verbal domain (see D€undar-Coecke & Tolmie, in
press, for a discussion) –meaning that a certain level of verbal ability is required to get this
off the ground, in line with the mediation effect in the path model for mechanism.
Scientific vocabulary may assist further with this process of translation.
In contrast to verbal ability, non-verbal ability as indexed by block design uniquely
predicted all components of the causal tasks, including inference of mechanism.
However, the logarithmic relationship of block scores to causal scores reflects a steeper
gradient of relationship at lower levels of performance on the latter, indicating that this is
where generic non-verbal ability made most difference. This is consistent with the lower
explained variance in the regression model for the highest level of explanation response,
mechanism, suggesting that at this level in particular, some additional non-verbal factor
might be a key element in children’s cognition of continuous causal processes.
The strong influence of non-verbal ability on causal reasoning about continuous
processes in words may seem surprising at first. However, to go beyond the observation
of a continuous process, as is necessary for thinking about causal variables and
connecting mechanisms, requires mental imagery, combining both visible (objects) and
intervening invisible (e.g., density, buoyancy) elements. The role of non-verbal ability in
this kind of thinking has been explored in another study (D€undar-Coecke & Tolmie,
2019b), which also found that higher levels of reasoning about causal effects do not rely
primarily on verbal but on non-verbal competences, suggesting that the finding here is
robust. These competences may further include detailed analysis of the spatial–temporal
characteristics of processes: the ability to extract key dimensions of information from
object states that change over time, to conceive of the sequence of dynamic
transformations that underlie such observed change, and to project these transforma-
tions onto past, present, and future experiences. This segmentation of a continuous
observation into meaningful steps is potentially the additional element suggested above.
A study in progress evaluates this view further.
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Conclusion
This is the first research on children’s causal reasoning in words about continuous
physical processes, including their inferences of the invisible mechanisms that underlie
these. Even the youngest participants were able to give sensible descriptions of what they
could observe, but children’s causal explanations, both their abstraction of causal
variables and inferences of mechanism, developed more slowly than their observation
skills and application of prior knowledge, suggesting that thinking about continuous
natural processes may be hard for elementary school children. However, although this
ability lags behind reasoning about mechanism in more transparent contexts, and is
affected by the nature of the processes involved, it is nevertheless clearly within their
competence. We have also illustrated that – in this sample at least – non-verbal ability is a
clear predictor of children’s reasoning.
Research on causal cognition should encompass not just analysis of events and
machineswith distinct cause–effect segments, as studied throughout psychology, but also
analysis of continuous processes. Such analysis is within the reach of elementary school
children, and we need to study it more if we wish to understand how they make the
transition towards adult – and genuinely scientific – causal reasoning.
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Appendix: Examples of explanation responses
Phenomena Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Sinking ‘They are heavy
and they sank to
the bottom’
‘The stone is
heavier than the
berry so they
sank to the
bottom
differently’
‘They are both
heavier than
the water and cannot
hold air in it so
they sank to the
bottom. But the stone
sank quicker than
the berry because it’s got
more stuff
in it so the water
can’t hold it up
as it did to berry’
Absorption ‘If you dip the paper in
the water they get
wet because they’re
soft’
‘The tissue paper is
thinner than the
other paper so
water rises faster
in it’
‘The tissue paper has holes
in it that help water to
rise up. Water holds on
the walls of the holes and
layers and that helps it to
climb up. Other paper
has some space in it, but
not as much as the tissue
paper’
Solution ‘They go into water
because they’re small
and spread out’
‘The table salt is
smaller than the
rock salt so it
disappears
quicker’
‘The size of the two types
of salt is different. And
this is more rocky so
water cannot go into it
easily. They both dissolve
in the water, but rocky
one takesmore time than
the table salt’
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